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TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS: 
I am writing this letter to let you know why I have not 
filed a brief as stated in your letter to me dated July 5, 
1990. When I received your letter, I contacted Legal Aid 
of Salt Lake, since it was through them that I received my 
divorce. I was told with the full child support that I now 
receive, that I was not eligible to go through them. I 
then contacted several attorneys and was told what the 
cost would be, and frankly, I can not afford that. I am 
making$5.76 per hour, working 36-40 hours per week. I 
also receive $350 per month for child support. 
I felt I had to write and let you know how I felt about 
this appeal. Mr Tripp, the defendant and appellant, was 
told he could drop health coverage on the chiIdren since 
my employment through FHP provided it. I pay $23.46 every 
two weeks for that insurance (copy enclosed). There is no 
charge for office visits, x-rays, lab work, or immunizations. 
There is a $2.00 charge for prescriptions. There is also 
a small charge for glasses and some of the dental work if it 
is needed. From May 3, 1989 through Dec. 12, 1989, Mr Tripp 
payed a total of $70 in back medical bills when the court 
ordered him to. Since then, there is a total of $117 in 
medical expenses, of which Mr Tripp owes \ of. I have never 
received that money. I have not pursued court action on this 
as I don't feel $58.50 is worth what it would cost me to take 
him to court to collect. 
I feel Mr Tripp should either take out full coverage 
on the children or pay 507o of all non covered medical 
expenses and possibly 507o of the amount of the medical 
coverage that I now pay, as he is the father and should 
help with his own children. 
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The other item Mr Tripp is appealing is the tax 
exemption of the children. As Mr Tripp is only paying 
$116 per month per child, I don!t feel he is paying \ of 
their expenses to be able tQc use one of the children as 
an exemption. With 2 of the children being boys, they are 
involved in the scouting, as well as sports. The other child, 
a 13 year old girl, in Junior High School, with school 
activities that require additional money that I pay. 
I am paying this as well as their daily needs, such as 
food, clothing, place to live with all the expense that 
comes with that. 
The court made a decision when this degree was granted. 
And I have tried to follow it as closely as possible. 
So, if the court feels it necessary to change the degree, I 
will also follow the new ruling that you change if you see 
fit to do so. 
I don't know if this letter will h&lp my case, but 
as I have stated at the beginning of this letter, I can 
not support my children and also support the lawyers with 
the little income I have coming in. But I do hope you will 
take what I have stated into consideration in your decision. 
Shelly Ann Tripp 
4511 White Flower Way 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
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ease No. 890425-CA 
In Re: 
Shelley Ann Tripp, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Lowell Bryce Tripp, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Dear Mr. Kinateder: 
Enclosed is a copy of a letter received from the 
appellee in the above appeal, which we note has not been 
served on you. 
I spoke with Mrs. Tripp to see if she intended to file 
a brief and she indicated this letter is in lieu of her 
brief. 
Therefore, if you intend to file a reply brief, it is 
due August 16th. If not, it is your responsibility to have 
the trial court forward the record to this court. The case 
will then be placed in the calendar pipeline to work its 
way down to be scheduled for oral argument. 
Janice Ray 
Deputy Clerk 
cc: Shelley Tripp 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHELLEY ANN TRIPP, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs . 
LOWELL BRYCE TRIPP, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I. 
JURISDICTION AND NATU 
This is a divorce ac 
Judicial District Court in and 
State of Utah. Defendant/appe 
Court pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2a 
Divorce entered on May 3, 1989 
S. Sawaya. 
II, 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in signing 
1 
Case No. 890425-CA 
Case Priority 14.b 
RE OF PROCEEDINGS 
tion filed in the Third 
for Salt Lake County, 
llant appeals to this 
-3(g) from a Decree of 
, by the Honorable James 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, over the 
objections of appellant, which Findings, Con-
clusions and Decree were beyond the award referred 
to in the Court's Memorandum Opinion? 
B. Did the trial court err in not deciding issues 
raised at trial; namely, the tax exemptions to be 
awarded to the parties. The trial court did not 
address the issue in its Memorandum Decision nor in 
the Findings, 
III . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant/appellant requests the appellate 
court to remand to the trial Court with instructions 
tO: 
A. 
B. 
Take additional evidence regarding the parties1 
ability to provide medical insurance for the 
children pursuant to the needs of the children and 
the ability of the parties to pay the same and for 
the Court to determine this in supplementary 
findings; 
Make a determination and findings regarding tax 
exemptions as to children and their allocation to 
the parties. 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce action which was commenced 
in March, of 1988. Trial was held on February 28, 
1989, before the Honorable James S. Sawaya, who 
rendered a Memorandum Decision on March 1, 1989. From 
a Decree entered on May 3, 1989, appellant/defendant 
filed his Notice of Appeal on July 3, 1989. 
After trial on the issues of the divorce, the 
trial court issued a Memorandum Decision and requested 
plaintiff's counsel to prepare Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. The findings submitted added bene-
fits to plaintiff not referred to in the Memorandum 
Decision, among which was the order that the defendant 
pay one-half (1/2) of all medical bills not covered by 
plaintiff's insurance. During the trial the evidence 
had established that plaintiff and defendant were both 
carrying insurance on the parties' children and the 
court commented, and defendant through his counsel sub-
mitted, a solution; namely to the affect that instead 
of paying premiums for superfluous insurance, the 
defendant should increase his alimony to the plaintiff. 
The Memorandum Decision reflected this conclusion of 
the court, while the prepared findings added obliga-
3 
tions to the defendant, in addition to those specified 
by the Memorandum Decision. Appellant's counsel 
objected to the prepared Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and when no response to the 
objection was filed in the time provided by the rules, 
defendant's counsel submitted the matter in writing to 
the court. Plaintiff's counsel then submitted new 
findings which contained the same objections to the 
findings except those minor in nature. The court, 
however, signed the Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court abused its discretion in signing 
Findings and Decree which included an award to 
plaintiff not referred to in the Court's Memorandum 
Decision, but which was inserted by plaintiff's 
counsel. The Court also erred in not making a 
determination as to the rights of the parties for tax 
exemptions on the children. 
4 
VI. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
THROUGH A DECREE OF DIVORCE WHICH ADDED 
HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS TO THE WIFE NOT 
SOUGHT AT TRIAL AND WHICH WERE NOT INCLUDED 
IN THE COURT'S MEMORANDUM DECISION. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5 (1), 
states: 
When a Decree of Divorce is rendered, the 
court may include in it equitable orders 
in it relating to the children, property, 
and parties. The court shall include the 
following in every Decree of Divorce: an 
order assigning responsibility for the pay-
ment of reasonable and necessary medical 
and dental expenses of the dependent child-
ren; and (b) if coverage is available at a 
reasonable cost an order requiring the pur-
chase and maintenance of appropriate health, 
hospital and dental care insurance for the 
dependent children. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that because 
the trial court has considerable latitude in fashioning 
appropriate child support orders, the courts should not 
disturb the actions of the trial court unless there has 
been an abuse of discretion. Proctor v. Proctor, 773, 
1389, at 1390, (citing Woodward v. Woodward, 709, P. 
2d, at 394; Jorgenson v. Jorgenson, 667, P. 2d, at 22. 
In Proctor y. Proctor, the Supreme Court remanded to 
the trial court because: 
5 
The final decree does not accurately re-
flect the trial judge's intentions, as 
revealed in his oral ruling and the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (Proctor y^ _ 
Proctor, 773 P. 2d, at 1390) 
We do not know from the case as reported in 
the Pacific Reporter what specifically the Findings and 
oral comments of the trial court were; however, the 
Utah Supreme Court did have the record before it and 
determined that the Decree was adverse to the Findings 
of the trial court in its oral contentions. This is 
similar to the instant case in that the Court had pro-
vided in its Memorandum Opinion that the defendant 
would not be obligated to pay for the medical insurance 
of the children though he had previously done so. The 
Court in the instant case, however, did sign Findings 
providing for payment of medical expenses which went 
beyond the provisions of the Memorandum Opinion. So 
the instant case differs slightly from Proctor v. 
Proctor, in that the Decree is adverse to the written 
opinion, but not the Findings. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Bake y_^  B_akjs, 772 
P. 2d, 461, reversed where Findings were inadequate. 
In Bake v. Bake, the Court found that the 
Findings did not support an award of child support. 
This case moves us closer to the instant one. There 
6 
the court stated that had there been Findings, they 
would be deferred to unless they were clearly 
erroneous. The Court then cites a criminal case of 
1987, State v. Walker, 743 P. 2d, 191, 193, where, at 
page 193, there is a discussion into the definition of 
erroneous Findings. The Court cites United States v. 
IJnited States Gypsum C^. , 333 U.S. 364, 395: 
A Finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, 
the reviewing court on the entire evidence 
is left with a definite and firm convic-
tion that a mistake has been made. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Walker 
states : 
There, the content of Rule 52(a) is clearly 
an erroneous standard imported from the Fed-
eral rule, requires that if the Findings (or 
the trial court's verdict in a criminal case,) are 
against the clear weight of the evidence, 
or the appellate court otherwise reaches a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made, the Findings (or verdict) will 
be set aside. 
Appellant argues that the Findings were 
clearly erroneous because the Court and the parties 
intended to have alimony raised in lieu of the 
insurance coverage provided by the defendant. The 
trial court on the third page of its Memorandum 
Decision (Record at No.79) stated: 
Plaintiff is employed by FHP and is pro-
vided medical and hospital insurance by 
7 
them for her benefit and the benefit of 
the children, consequently she is ordered 
to continue that coverage until further 
order of the court, and defendant is 
obligated to provide no medical or 
dental insurance for the benefit of the 
children. 
Nonetheless, plaintiff's counsel inserted one 
additional sentence in the Findings of Fact, which went 
far beyond the Court's Memorandum Decision, In the 
Findings submitted to counsel on or about March 24, 
1989, was inserted the additional sentence: 
Both parties should be ordered to pay 
one-half of all non-covered and deduc-
tible medical and dental expenses for 
the benefit of the minor children. 
This additional sentence was objected to by counsel for 
the defendant and when no response was received from 
plaintiff's counsel, the matter was submitted for 
decision. Plaintiff's counsel immediately corrected 
other objections made to the Findings (the insertion of 
a legal description omitted), but refused to omit the 
offending language pertaining to additional medical 
coverage. The Honorable James S. Sawaya signed the 
revised Findings without further testimony or hearing. 
Immediately after receipt of the Memorandum 
Decision of the Court, appellant/defendant dropped his 
coverage for the children and began paying additional 
alimony. The plaintiff, however, began submitting 
8 
additional medical bills to the defendant for any item 
which could be construed as a medical expense. 
Defendant could not pay for these, mainly because he 
had dropped the additional insurance, and was also 
paying the additional alimony. 
From the transcript it is clear that one of 
the conditions of the plaintiff's employment with FHP 
was that she use the coverage provided by the company 
and the services with FHP exclusively. 
The defendant testified that after a pre-
trial hearing he was ordered to obtain health insurance 
for the three children and did so. (T. p. 103) 
Later, according to his testimony, the plaintiff/wife 
informed him that she had received employment through 
FHP and did not need the insurance, though the insu-
rance would provide secondary coverage. 
Q And do you recall a discussion at one 
of the pre-trial hearings where she said 
she had to use FHP? 
A [Defendant] Yes. 
Q And if she uses FHP, what if any good 
does this insurance do for your children? 
A It would only cover a secondary — if FHP 
does not cover it, they could resubmit 
it through Alta Health Strategies. 
Q Would you be willing to increase your 
child support if the Court gave you 
permission despite the request of the 
9 
joined party today to drop that extra 
health insurance for your children? 
A If so ordered, I would drop the health 
insurance and increase the child support, 
but there's no way I can increase the 
child support and do the health insur-
ance at the same time. (T. p. 104) 
It is clear also that the Court was aware of 
the FHP coverage and the coverage of the defendant and 
thought both were superfluous. 
THE COURT: These kids are covered by FHP 
at your employment? They are also covered 
by your employment. Is there any need for 
two coverages? (T. p. 104-105) 
It is clear that the counsel for the plain-
tiff contemplated the increase of alimony by the 
dropping of the health insurance. 
MR. GREGAN: I have made a computation 
that shows that approximately $60 a 
month in child support would be the 
effect of dropping the insurance. His 
child support under the guidelines 
should be increased by that. (T. p. 105) 
The only conclusion one could draw from the 
testimony in the transcript is that there was to be an 
increase in alimony with the dropping of defendant's 
insurance on the children. This is no benefit to him; 
however, if every conceivable medical expense incurred 
by the plaintiff must be submitted to the husband for 
50% reimbursement. He would have been better off to 
carry the secondary medical insurance. The Court made 
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no comment whatsoever regarding reimbursement to plain-
tiff in its Memorandum Decision and the Finding is 
clearly a mistake. Had the trial Court found from the 
evidence that the defendant had the means to pay for 
additional reimbursement to plaintiff for all medical 
and dental expenses incurred for the children, his 
Findings should have explained why the Court was making 
a clear departure from its recommendations in the Memo-
randum Decision and why the additional award was 
justified. In Jensen v. Jensen, 275 P. 2d, 436, the 
Utah Supreme Court reversed where the trial Court made 
insufficient Findings to justify additional relief to 
one of the parties where neither the Court's comments 
from the bench nor its initial order explained its 
reasoning in providing the relief. Therefore, a 
reversal is required and either additional evidence 
should be taken on the issue or additional Findings 
made by the Court to justify the relief which went 
beyond the Memorandum Decision. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECIDING ISSUES 
RAISED AT TRIAL; NAMELY, THE TAX EXEMPTIONS 
TO BE AWARDED TO THE PARTIES. THE TRIAL COURT 
DID NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUE IN ITS MEMORANDUM 
DECISION NOR IN THE FINDINGS. 
The trial Court failed to make a determin-
11 
ation regarding the award of tax exemptions to the 
parties pursuant to the needs of the children and the 
degree of support provided by the parties. The Court 
has held in J^efferies v_^  .Jefferies, 752 P. 2d, 909, 
911, that the trial Court must enter Findings of Fact 
on all relevant issues. The Court should, therefore, 
remand to the trial Court requesting Findings of Fact 
based on the evidence before the Court which will make 
a determination to the benefit of the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, because of the clearly erroneous 
Findings and the necessity of determining the parties1 
rights as to tax exemptions, counsel for appellant 
respectfully requests a remand to the trial Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / / day of 
April, 1990. 
J. DOdGLAS KINATEDER 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Appellant 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
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SHELLEY ANN TRIPP, 
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vs . 
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CERTIFICATE OF 
FILING AND SERVICE 
Case No. 890425-CA 
Case Priority 14.b 
J. DOUGLAS KINATEDER, Attorney for Defendant/ 
Appellant, Lowell Bryce Tripp, hereby certifies that on 
the 19th day of April, 1990, the original and seven 
copies of the Brief of Appellant were filed with the 
Clerk of the Court of Appeals and that a true and 
correct copy of the Brief of Appellant were mailed, 
postage prepaid, to plaintiff, Shelley Ann Tripp, at 
4511 S. White Flower Way, West Valley City, Utah 84120 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of 
April, 1990. 
J. DOUGLAS KINATEDER 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Appellant 
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